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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20070528-CA

v.
TROY JOSEPH ARCHULETTA,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count each of
aggravated burglary, a first degree felony, and assault, a class
A misdemeanor (R. 105-06)- 1

This Court has jurisdiction over the

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)(West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion to
reduce the charge of aggravated burglary to criminal trespass,
where the plain language of the criminal trespass statute
excluded defendant's conduct from its ambit?
Review "under the Shondel rule ^focuses on the trial court's
legal conclusions, which [the appellate court] review[s] under a
correction-of-error standard, according no particular deference

1

Defendant's appeal focuses exclusively on the conviction
for aggravated burglary. He does not dispute the correctness of
the assault conviction. See Br. of Aplt. at 5 n.l.

to the trial court's ruling.'" State v. Kent, 945 P.2d 145, 146
(Utah App. 1997)(quoting State v. Voat, 824 P.2d 455, 456

(Utah

App.1991)); accord State v. Green, 2000 UT App 33, $ 5, 995 P.2d
1250;

see also State v. Pixton, 2004 UT App 275,5 4, 98 P.3d 433

(trial court's interpretation of statutes is reviewed for correctness]
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202

(West 2004), governing burglary,

provides in relevant part:
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he
enters or remains unlawfully in a building or
any portion of a building with intent to
commit:
•

• •

(c) an assault on any person[.]
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203

(West 2004), governing aggravated

burglary, provides in relevant part:
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated burglary
if in attempting, committing, or fleeing from
a burglary the actor or another participant
in the crime:
(a) causes bodily injury to any person
who is not a participant in the crime[.]
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206

(Supp. 2007), governing criminal

trespass, provides in relevant part:
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass
if, under circumstances not amounting to
burglary as defined in Section 76-6-202, 766-203 . . .
(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on
property and:

2

(i) intends to cause annoyance or
injury to any person or damage to
any property. . .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count each of aggravated
burglary, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-203 (West 2004), and assault, a class A misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (West 2004).

Following a

preliminary hearing, a magistrate bound him over for trial (R.
27-28; R. 190). After a jury heard the State's evidence,
defendant moved to dismiss the aggravated burglary charge or
reduce it to criminal trespass (R. 191: 128-29).

The court

denied the motion, and the jury convicted defendant as charged
(Id. at 135-36; R. 172).
The court sentenced defendant to a suspended prison term of
five-years-to-life on the aggravated burglary conviction and 365
days in jail, with one day suspended, on the assault conviction
(R. 176-78).

The court imposed 36 months of probation and a

variety of conditions, including full-time work, anger management
intervention, random drug tests and searches, and abstinence from
drugs and alcohol (Id.).

The court held the amount of

restitution open for sixty days (Id.).

Defendant filed a timely

notice of appeal (R. 180). The Supreme Court transferred
jurisdiction to the court of appeals.

3

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant had been out of touch with his mother for about a
month (R. 191: 138). One July morning, while driving down State
Street in Salt Lake with three friends, he spotted the vehicle
that his mother and Dave Florez, her boyfriend of five years,
typically drove (R. 191: 140). The car was parked at the Capitol
Motel, in front of a room whose door was open (Id. at 19, 23, 40,
101-02f 145).

Defendant asked the driver to stop so that he

could see his mother (Id. at 141).
Defendant jumped out of the car and peered into the vehicle
he thought belonged to his mother and Dave to ensure he had the
right vehicle (Id. at 141) .2

Noticing a woman standing in the

doorway of the motel room adjacent to the parking spot, defendant
asked if she knew whose car it was (Id. at 26-27, 44, 142, 155,
157).

The woman asked him why he wanted to know (Id. at 27, 45,

142) .
Unbeknownst to defendant, his mother and Dave were no longer
a couple, and the woman standing in the doorway was staying at
the motel with Dave (Id. at 19). The woman testified at trial
that when defendant approached her, he was accompanied by another

2

According to defendant, his mother and the victim had an
"up an down" relationship, "were struggling," "didn't even have a
place," and "were living in motels
. . .[or] up at the
mountains" (R. 191: 152, 154).
4

man.

She stated that she did not invite them into the motel

room, that defendant "pushed past me into the room," that she
asked him to leave "a couple of times," that the other man closed
the motel room door once they were all inside, and that she
thought they "were getting robbed" (Id. at 27, 30, 36, 51-52, 62,
115) .3
Dave testified that he heard his new girlfriend outside the
motel room talking to a male about the car and that he "kind of
could sense the distress in her voice" (Id, at 69). He got off
the bed and saw defendant and another man approach.

When the

girlfriend tried to block the two men from entering the room,
Dave, who recognized defendant, moved her aside (Id. at 85-88).
Dave testified that he sensed trouble from the start and asked
defendant and his cohort to let the woman leave.

He said that

they refused and that defendant ordered the other man to close
the door (Id^ at 70-71) .
Defendant offered a different version of how the encounter
began.

He agreed that when the woman asked him why he wanted

information about the car parked outside the motel room, he
approached her to explain (Id. at 142). At that juncture,
however, he spotted Dave sitting on the bed in the motel room.

3

A Salt Lake City police officer also testified that the
woman reported she had asked defendant to leave the motel room
(R. 191: 123). Whether defendant entered or remained in the room
unlawfully has not been raised as an issue on appeal.
5

Defendant and Dave exchanged greetings, and defendant walked into
the room, "figur[ing] that was my mom and Dave's motel room" (Id.
at 145). 4

He quickly looked around for his mother and, failing

to see her, asked Dave where she was (Id.).
The essence of what happened next is not in dispute.

Dave

told defendant that he was not with his mother anymore, and that
he did not know where she was, but that "she's probably with some
guy or something because I caught her like a week earlier in a
motel room with a guy" (Id. at 72; accord id. at 53, 89, 147).
Defendant testified that Dave called his mother a "whore" (Id. at
147).

In any event, defendant conceded that when Dave

"disrespected" his mother, he got upset and punched Dave in the
face with his fist (Id. at 167, 169-70).

Defendant then left the

room.
Defendant's single blow fractured and significantly
displaced Dave's nose.

Although defendant characterized the hit

as a Mlucky blow," Dave's nose required surgery and could not be
restored to its former straightness even with the use of screws
and plates (Id^ at 98, 170).

4

Defendant conceded he had not been invited into the room
but thought that Dave and his mother were still together. At
trial, he rhetorically asked, "[I]f you're part of somebody's
family, do you — do you just ask them to walk in when you're
going into their house?" (R. 191: 163).
6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant argues on appeal that he should not have been
convicted of aggravated burglary because the lesser included
offense of burglary has the same elements as criminal trespass.
Consequently, he asserts, he could only be charged and convicted
of the crime carrying the lesser penalty — criminal trespass.
Defendant's argument invokes the Shondel doctrine, which
holds that if two statutes are "wholly duplicative" and thus
define the same offense, a defendant is entitled to be sentenced
under the statute carrying the lesser penalty.

State v. Bryan,

709 P.2d 257, 263 (Utah 1985) (citing State v. Shondel, 435 P.2d
146 (Utah 1969)).
reasons.

Defendant's Shondel argument fails for two

First, defendant asks this Court to reverse or to

reduce his felony conviction to a misdemeanor by comparing
burglary with criminal trespass.
with and

Defendant, however, was charged

convicted of aggravated burglary, not burglary.

Thus,

for Shondel purposes, the elements of criminal trespass must be
compared with the elements of aggravated burglary, not simple
burglary.

Aggravated burglary requires that the actor "causes

bodily injury," while criminal trespass requires only an intent
to cause annoyance or injury.

Because the two statutes are not

"wholly duplicative," Shondel does not apply to his case.
709 P.2d at 263.

7

Bryan,

Second, even assuming arguendo that a comparison between
simple burglary and criminal trespass were appropriate, the plain
language of the criminal trespass and burglary statutes reveals
that the two crimes are not identical.

The plain language of the

criminal trespass statute explicitly states that a person is
guilty of criminal trespass only if the circumstances
constituting the crime do not amount "to burglary as defined in
Section 76-6-202 [burglary], 76-6-203 [aggravated burglary] or
76-6-204 [burglary of a vehicle]. . .."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-

206. Because the two crimes are not "wholly duplicative," Shondel
does not apply.
Here, where it is undisputed that defendant entered or
remained unlawfully in the motel room and intended to assault the
victim, his conduct fell squarely within the burglary statute.
Pursuant to the plain language of the criminal trespass statute,
the inquiry ends because there is no overlap between the two
statutes.

That is, culpability for burglary forecloses the

possibility that defendant committed the lesser offense of
criminal trespass.

Where defendant was culpable for burglary and

where there is no dispute that the victim sustained bodily
injury, the trial court properly refused to reduce the charge
from aggravated burglary to criminal trespass.

8

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO REDUCE THE
CHARGE OF AGGRAVATED BURGLARY TO
CRIMINAL TRESPASS WHERE THE PLAIN
LANGUAGE OF THE CRIMINAL TRESPASS
STATUTE EXCLUDES DEFENDANT'S
CONDUCT FROM ITS AMBIT
Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his
motion to reduce the felony charge of aggravated burglary to a
misdemeanor charge of criminal trespass (Br. of Aplt. at 10). He
reaches this conclusion by asserting that he could not be
convicted of aggravated burglary because he could not be
convicted of burglary (Id. at 5 ) . He contends that, "pursuant to
equal protection guarantees," he could not be convicted of
burglary because the elements of burglary and criminal trespass
are identical (Id.).

And, where two crimes have the same

elements, he concludes that he could be charged and convicted
only of the crime carrying the lesser penalty—criminal trespass
(Id. at 9-10).
Defendant's argument is based on State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d
146 (Utah 1969). 5

Under Shondel, when two statutes define two

crimes having exactly the same elements but carrying different
penalties, a defendant is entitled to the lesser penalty.

5

That

While defendant nowhere cites to Shondel in his appellate
brief, he does briefly cite to State v. Bryan, one of Shondel's
progeny. See Br. of Aplt. at 5. Also, at trial, defense counsel
explicitly referenced Shondel to support this argument. See R.
191: 131-33.
9

is, "where there is doubt or uncertainty as to which of two
punishments is applicable to an offense[,] an accused is entitled
to the benefit of the lesser."
omitted).

453 P.2d at 148 (citations

The doctrine is limited in scope because it "applies

only when the two statutory provisions proscribe precisely the
same conduct."

State v. Jensen, 2004 UT App 467, 116, 105 P.3d

951 (citing State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, 533, 52 P.3d 1210).

Two

statutes are the same when they are "wholly duplicative as to the
elements of the crime."

State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d at 263.

This case does not fall within the ambit of Shondel for two
reasons.

First, defendant's argument turns on a comparison of

the burglary and criminal trespass statutes.
was not charged with burglary.
burglary.

Defendant, however,

He was charged with aggravated

For purposes of Shondel, then, the elements of

criminal trespass must be compared to the elements of aggravated
burglary, not simple burglary.
are clear.

The results of this comparison

Aggravated burglary requires that the actor "causes

bodily injury," while criminal trespass requires only the intent
to cause annoyance or injury.

Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-

203(1) (a) with Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206 (2) (a) (i) .

The two

statutes are, therefore, not "wholly duplicative," and Shondel
does not apply.

Bryan, 709 P.2d at 263.

Second, even assuming arguendo that a comparison between
simple burglary and criminal trespass were appropriate, the plain

10

language of the criminal trespass statute makes clear that the
two statutes do not overlap, much less that they proscribe the
same conduct and are "wholly duplicative."'

"Where statutory

language is plain and unambiguous, appellate courts cannot look
beyond the language to divine legislative intent, but must
construe the statute according to its plain language."

State v.

Paul, 860 P.2d 992, 993 (Utah App. 1993) (citing Brinkerhoff v.
Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989)); see also Norman J.
Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.01 (5th ed.
1992)(if statutory meaning is clear, court's sole function is to
enforce statute according to its terms).
Here, the plain language of the criminal trespass statute
leaves no doubt as to which of two punishments is applicable to
defendant's conduct because the two statutes do not proscribe the
same conduct.

The statute's plain language forecloses any

Shondel claim because it specifically excludes any overlap
between burglary and criminal trespass.

The criminal trespass

statute provides:
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass

if, under circumstances not amounting to
burglary as defined in Section 16-6-202, 166-203

. ..

(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on
property and:
(i) intends to cause annoyance or
injury to any person or damage to
any property. . .

11

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206(2) (emphasis added).

When interpreting

a statute, " [w]e presume that words are used in their ordinary
sense." State v. Paul, 860 P.2d at 993 (citations omitted).

As

long as the ordinary meaning of a word results in a statutory
application that is reasonably clear and operable and does not
contradict the express purpose of the statute, then that ordinary
meaning controls.

Morton Int T l, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814 P.2d

581, 590 (Utah 1991); accord Archer v. Board of Lands & Forestry,
907 P.2d 1142, 1145 (Utah 1995); Commercial Inv. Corp. v.
Siqqard, 936 P.2d 1105, 1111 (Utah App. 1997); B.L. Key, Inc. v.
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 934 P.2d 1164, 1166 (Utah App. 1997).
Here, the plain language of the criminal trespass statute,
xx

under circumstances not amounting to burglary," provides that a

person is guilty of criminal trespass only if the circumstances
of the crime do not amount to burglary, as defined by the
burglary and aggravated burglary statutes.

Pursuant to the

ordinary meaning of this phrase, no overlap exists between acts
constituting criminal trespass and those constituting burglary.
If defendant has fulfilled the requirements for burglary, he has
committed that crime and not criminal trespass.

By definition,

then, criminal trespass is something less than burglary.6

6

Indeed, the court instructed the jury on criminal
trespass as well as on the elements of burglary and aggravated
burglary (R. 163-66). Had the jury believed that defendant
committed a crime that did not amount to burglary, it could have
convicted him of criminal trespass. The jury, however, rejected
12

On appeal, defendant does not dispute that the evidence
established the elements of burglary.

He does not dispute either

that he entered or remained in the motel room unlawfully or that
he assaulted the victim.

He limits his appellate argument to the

assertion that criminal trespass forbids precisely the same
conduct as burglary.

But he reaches that conclusion only by

ignoring a key phrase in the criminal trespass statute, "under
circumstances not amounting to burglary as defined in Section 766-202, 76-6-203."

His argument fails.

The law is well-settled that "when two statutes under
consideration do not proscribe the same conduct, . . . defendant
may be charged with the crime carrying the more severe sentence."
State v. Clark, 632 P.2d 841, 844 (Utah 1981) (citations
omitted); accord State v. Kent, 945 P.2d at 147-49.

Here, when

defendant entered the motel room and formed the intent to assault
the victim, he fulfilled all the elements of burglary.
Consequently, he could not be guilty of the lesser-included
offense of criminal trespass, which comes into play only "under
circumstances not amounting to burglary."
203(2).

Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-6-

And, when defendant punched the victim so forcefully in

the nose as to fracture and displace it, he caused bodily injury
that elevated his crime to aggravated burglary.

that alternative (R. 172).
13

Under these

circumstances, the trial court properly denied his motion to
reduce the charge of aggravated burglary to criminal trespass.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
conviction on one count each of aggravated burglary, a first
degree felony, and assault, a class A misdemeanor.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 29th day of November, 2007.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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